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INTRODUCTION
The Internet has transformed the way Americans work, play, and shop. A new wave of Internet accessibility, the availability of broadband (high-speed) access, has the potential to be as revolutionary as the first wave. Broadband access, usually through Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) or cable modem technology for residences and leased lines for businesses, allows users to send and receive enormous quantities of data, audio, video, and voice communication, and relaxes the constraints of the "World Wide Wait".
With every technological revolution comes the possibility that some will be left behind.
The so-called "Digital Divide"-the well-documented gap in computer and Internet usage between richer and poorer households, whites and certain minority groups, and urban and rural areas 1 -has received much attention in the past few years, both in policy circles and the popular press.
The public-policy focus on the Digital Divide is shifting toward broadband Internet access. In a widely cited report, the Department of Commerce (NTIA, 2000) finds that in terms of household broadband subscription, black and Hispanic households lag white households, rural areas lag urban areas, and poorer households lag more affluent households. Such findings commingle non-adoption of broadband access by households and non-implementation of the technology by carriers. One unanswered question, therefore, is whether groups lacking broadband access are deprived because broadband services are not available where they live. Preliminary findings by the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC, 2000a) indicate that broadband is less likely to be available in rural and lower-income areas. While lacking direct evidence, the FCC (2000a at 241) furthermore concludes that "minority customers are vulnerable to not having access to advanced services in as timely a fashion as most other Americans." Faulhaber and Hogendorn (2000) conclude from a model based on engineering data that the unconstrained market at maturity will leave at least twelve percent of U.S. households without broadband avail-ability, due to cost and demand considerations. Findings such as these lead some observers and interest groups to charge that market forces are leading to the unequal availability of broadband, 2 with some advocates going as far as charging broadband carriers with "redlining".
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These charges warrant careful study for three reasons. First, federal policies currently proposed to narrow the broadband Digital Divide are based on an incomplete examination of the data. Such policies include a host of pending legislation in the 107 th Congress. 4 The FCC is also actively involved in monitoring the Digital Divide, because it is charged by the Telecommunications Act of 1996 5 to monitor and encourage the "reasonable and timely" deployment of broadband to "all Americans". Although it has not
done so yet, the FCC has the authority to add broadband to the list of services supported under federal Universal Service programs if it deems necessary. Second, since availability is a precondition for access, any analysis of the Digital Divide must begin with the supply side. Third, broadband is an important technology whose study advances the empirical literature on the economics of diffusion.
This study explores the causes of the unequal availability of broadband. Do the racial composition, income, and rural location of an area affect whether broadband is available? The results contain some surprises. Simple regressions imply that high concentrations of poor, minority, and rural households decrease the probability of broadband access. However, after controlling for cost conditions, other demand factors, and competition in local telephony the income and minority effects largely disappear. Among racial composition factors, only those for Native Americans and Asians have significant negative effects on broadband availability. Those for blacks, ethnic Hispanics, and other nonwhite races have no significant impact. Even for Native Americans and Asians, the negative effects on access disappear in some areas when language of the household is taken into account. Furthermore, a nonparametric investigation shows the evidence for the dis-advantage of Native Americans and Asians is inconsistent across the range of the race variables. More important determinants of broadband availability are demand characteristics such as age, education, commuting time to work, gender ratio, and size of businesses in the area.
A few studies have looked at demand for broadband services by individuals (Madden et al. 2000; NTIA 2000) . Fewer studies have looked at the supply side of the market, in large part due to the difficulty of gathering data on DSL and cable modem rollouts. A new, nearly comprehensive broadband survey by the FCC enables study of the supply of broadband for the first time using data from the entire United States. My approach is closest to that of Gabel and Kwan (2001) , who study broadband availability at 287 wire centers. 6 The present study, on the other hand, covers services offered through nearly all of the more than 22,000 wire centers. Gillett and Lehr (1999) study cable modem access in the 3,133 U.S. counties. Counties are relatively large for the purpose of determining broadband coverage, given, for example, that DSL is typically available only within 3.5 miles of a central office. The present study takes the ZIP code to be the unit of observation, yielding a potential 29,769 observations. The next section discusses implications of using ZIP code areas.
The next section outlines the empirical strategy I use to investigate the causes of the unequal availability of broadband. Section III overviews broadband technology, section IV describes the data, section V presents the results, and a final section discusses policy implications.
II. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
As in Berry's (1992) model of airline entry, I model the decision by a broadband carrier to enter a geographic market as depending on the expected demand in the area, costs, and entry by other firms. Unlike Berry (1992) , I employ reduced form models.
The main estimations are probit models on a binary variable for broadband availability of any type in a ZIP code area, and model entry as a flexible function of regional demographic, economic, and competitive information. The empirical strategy is to examine the coefficients on the variables reflecting minority composition, rural location, and lowincome areas, because of the policy concern mentioned above that these areas are vulnerable to lagging in broadband access. Previous governmental studies have emphasized the race, income, and rural dimensions of the Digital Divide (FCC 2000b; NTIA 2000) , but those studies examine each variable in isolation through simple cross-tabulations without controls. Interpreting results from such studies requires care, as the following illustration shows.
Jump ahead for the moment to the first results reported in Section V, from a simple estimation including variables for minorities, urban/rural location, and fixed effects for
Bell companies and states only (Table 2 , first columns). The negative and significant coefficient on % black indicates that the higher the percentage of blacks in an area, the lower is the probability of broadband access. Studies of redlining in the mortgage lending market such as Tootell (1996) point out that there are three possible reasons for such a finding. First, the relationship could be causal, due to entrants' expectations that black households have lower demand for broadband service. In this case, carriers do not enter because they expect profit to be too low to support entry. Second, the relationship could be causal, but in this case based not solely on expected profit but on Becker's (1971) "taste for discrimination". In this case, carriers do not enter some areas even though they would support entry, merely because of racial discrimination. This second case comes closest to "redlining" in the broadband market, although minority advocates using the term often do not distinguish between these two cases.
In the third possible reason, the apparent relationship between black household concentration and access is spurious, due to omitted variables that are positively correlated with black concentration and negatively correlated with entry. An example of such an omitted variable is the quality of the telecommunications infrastructure in an area. Areas with high concentrations of black households may tend to have older infrastructure, and therefore higher costs of deploying DSL or cable modem networks.
To distinguish the first two (causal relationship) hypotheses from the third (spurious relationship) hypothesis, in a second set of estimations I include a host of socioeconomic and competitive controls. A major advantage that the large sample size of this study lends is the ability to control for many demand and cost variables that previous studies such as Gillett and Lehr (1999) and Gabel and Kwan (2001) omitted. Adding these extra variables removes the significance of most of the income and race coefficients, with a few exceptions discussed below.
To distinguish between profit-based discrimination and "taste for discrimination" based on racial composition of the area, I supplement the race variables with language variables. If carriers discriminate against minority areas, it is plausible that they would discriminate against both non-White race and non-English language usage. The evidence below shows, however, that non-English language usage tends to increase access availability. The case for preference-based discrimination is thus weak and any discrimination is more likely to be profit-based (probably based on expected demand).
In the rest of this section I explore implications of two features of the data: lack of subscribership data and using ZIP code level data. First, note that the data tell us nothing about the scale of entry within each area. Lack of information on the scale of entry is common in entry studies in the industrial organization literature, such as Bresnahan and Reiss (1987) and Berry (1992) . Using a binary entry variable requires using a probit model, instead of using the number of subscribers in a tobit model. The estimates may be less precise in the probit than in the tobit, because there is less information in a binary variable (entry) than in a mixed continuous/discrete variable (subscribers), but will still be consistent if the model is correctly specified.
The data use ZIP code areas as the boundary for the unit of observation. While ZIP codes are an improvement over previous studies using larger areas, it is still true that broadband may not be available to all parts of the ZIP code area, which creates a potential difficulty in interpreting the results. Unequal availability within an area is not from carriers choosing individual households to which to offer broadband; once the local cable network or central office has been upgraded to offer broadband, the service is available to most subscribers in the service area. 7 Instead, uneven availability within a ZIP code area is due to the irregular overlap with service areas. Thus, one consequence of using ZIP code areas is that broadband diffusion is overstated. To see this, note that from 
IV. DATA
The data for the study come from three major sources: the FCC, Census, and a telecommunications wire center database. A complete list of variables and summary statistics for the data are in Table 1 .
Broadband Availability Data and Summary
The dependent variable, broadband availability from any source within a ZIP code, voluntarily, and some did so. Note that this definition raises a selection issue: the smallest rural carriers may not show up in the survey even if they offer broadband, which in turn will mean that the ZIP codes from those areas may falsely be recorded as not having broadband access. The selection bias is likely to be minor because few broadband providers would fall below the threshold. For example, current market analysis indicates that unless there are about 200 lines in a DSL service area (which is much smaller than a whole state), the investment will not pay off (Paradyne 2000, 5-6) . Nevertheless, the coefficients pertaining to rural areas, which may be served by small rural local exchange carriers with few customers, must be interpreted with this potential measurement error in mind.
The publicly available data do not indicate the type of company offering the service. In particular, DSL service is not distinguishable from cable modem service. The dependent variable in the estimations, then, is binary: whether there is at least one broadband customer in a ZIP code. Table 1 shows that 70% of ZIP code areas in the sample have broadband access.
These ZIP codes include 95% of the population of the U.S.; recall from the discussion in section II that this does not imply that broadband is available to 95% of households. See Figure 4 for a map depicting broadband availability.
Market Characteristics Data
Demand Variables. Factors influencing carriers' expected subscriber demand for broadband are captured by socioeconomic statistics at the ZIP code area level. The personal and household data are from the 1990 Census. 12 The business data are also from the Census Bureau. On the other hand, non-English speakers may value the opportunities that the Internet affords to connect with similar speakers across the nation and world. I include variables for percentages of Spanish-speaking , Asian language-speaking , and other languagespeaking households, and also the percentage of "linguistically isolated" households, in which no one speaks English as a first language nor "very well" as a second language.
There are two income variables in the study: median income and the percentage of households below the poverty threshold. Next are controls for the size of the residential and business markets. The type of firm may also matter; in other studies manufacturing, FIRE (finance, insurance, and real-estate), and service-oriented (e.g., management con- Given the focus on entry, and not competition after entry, I follow authors such as Berry (1992) in omitting price variables. 14 The demand variables described above provide the information that potential entrants use to determine their price, should they decide to enter. Including these demand variables in the estimations therefore proxies for the expected post-entry price and profit.
Costs. Various studies and industry sources suggest that relevant cost considerations for broadband deployment are fixed costs, subscriber density, and the vintage of the telecommunications infrastructure. 15 The fixed costs are from installing the necessary equipment in the wire center to enable DSL 16 or in the headend to enable cable modem service.
To the extent that average fixed costs vary among regions only through the number of subscribers (the denominator), and that subscription is a function of demographic variables, the inclusion of demographic variables will indirectly control for difference in average fixed costs.
Costs are lower in areas where subscriber density is higher. In denser areas the same investment at the wire center (for DSL) or the middle mile network (for cable modem service) reaches more potential subscribers. Also, in areas with low subscriber density, the average DSL customer is farther from the central office and requires stronger (and therefore more expensive) carrier signals to be sent. I include two density measures:
the number of occupied housing units with telephone access and population, both per square kilometer. The former may be a better measure for DSL deployment costs, since DSL requires a phone line, and the latter may be better for cable modem deployment costs.
The older the vintage of the local telecommunications and cable networks, the more expensive is broadband implementation. 17 Lacking direct data, I proxy the age of installed networks with the median age of the housing structures in the area. A final cost variable is the cost of connecting to the nearest Internet backbone. In rural areas without nearby access, connection costs may be higher than in urban areas. Also, rates for connecting to the Internet backbone tend to be lower in urban areas, due to competition among backbone access providers. Data on backbone access cost is not readily available, and so the rural and urban dummy variables will absorb systematic difference in these costs among regions. A National Telecommunications and Information Administration and Rural Utilities Service (2000, 9) study, however, downplays the importance of Internet backbone availability as an important difference between urban and rural areas, so perhaps these cost data are not crucial.
Local telecommunications competition. While cable companies mostly still enjoy monopolies within their service areas, local telecommunications competition has started to spring up since the passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Anecdotal evidence from the industry suggests that incumbent local exchange carriers are more likely to offer advanced services in areas in which they face competition. Some facilities-based competitors offer DSL themselves (and therefore appear in the dependent variable).
The FCC makes available a list of ZIP codes in which there is local competition. In one specification I include a dummy for the presence of at least one competing local exchange company (CLEC) in the area. That specification models jointly the availability of broadband and local telephony competition (see the appendix).
Telecommunications Carriers' Operating Areas. Industry reports suggest that some Bell carriers were more aggressive than others in deploying DSL. Indicator variables for the presence of one of the four remaining Bell firms as the incumbent local exchange carrier in the ZIP code are included: BellSouth, Qwest (fka U.S. West), SBC (Southwestern Bell Telephone, Pacific Bell, Nevada Bell, and Ameritech), Verizon (fka Bell Atlantic and NYNEX). 18 The excluded dummy is all non-Bell carriers.
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V. THE EVIDENCE FOR UNEQUAL AVAILABILITY OF BROADBAND
Here I present two sets of estimations. In Table 2 , simple probit estimations including only race, income, and geographic variables are presented. Table 3 includes expanded estimations investigating the impact of including cost and demand variables omitted from the simpler estimations.
Consider the first estimation reported in Table 2 , with race, ethnicity, and geographic variables only (urban/rural indicators, and Bell territory and state fixed effects).
The results accord with the common perception of the Digital Divide: the coefficients for blacks, Native Americans, and Hispanics and the rural variables are all negative and significant. The coefficient on the fraction of Asians in the area is significantly positive.
Before imputing causality to these findings, however, note that once income variables are added (last columns of Table 2 ), the race and ethnicity coefficients lose all significance.
Apparently income is an omitted variable in the first estimation that leads to spurious correlation between the race variables and broadband access. The results below show that once additional omitted variables are included, the significance of the coefficient on income is also lost. none of the statistically significant coefficients changes sign between estimations. 22 Except when specifically discussing race, ethnicity, and language, below I discuss the results of the second estimation (language variables but no CLEC variable). At the end of this section, I touch on the estimation with the CLEC presence included.
Race and Ethnicity
The race, ethnicity, and language coefficients in the second estimation (middle columns of Table 3 ) reveal interesting countervailing effects. The non-white race and Hispanic ethnicity coefficients are negative (with the exception of percentage black house-holds) but the non-English language coefficients are positive. These results for language may bolster theories, current in other social sciences, that individuals use the Internet to seek out a community of interest (Elkins 1997) . If so, then carriers may expect higher demand for broadband in areas with more non-English speakers and be more likely to implement access. As discussed in section II, positive non-English language effects imply that preference-based discrimination against minorities is unlikely.
The net effects from race and language can go either way. Table 4 illustrates the net effects of the race and language variables, presenting the fraction of observations for which various groups of race-related variables lead to a decreased probability of availability, ceteris paribus. If carriers' profit considerations adversely affect minorities, then the net effects of these race-related variables will be negative. For example, the first row summarizes the net effects from the % Asian, % language Asian, and the Asian:language Asian and Asian/linguistically isolated interactions, when calculated at sample values. In 95% of the observations, the net impact of these Asian-specific variables decreases access probability (compared to white, English-speaking households). When weighted by the Asian population in the area (the next column), the figure drops to about 74%. The figure drops further to about 54% if statistical significance is required of the evidence.
Thus, adverse access possibilities for Asians appear to be present in areas where 54% of the Asian population lives. Native Americans are the other racial group that suffers nearly universal lower probability of access than white, English-speaking households.
The evidence for unequal access is statistically strong in areas in which 89% of Native Americans live. Thus, for these two groups, the appearance of unequal availability warrants further investigation. However, the evidence for unequal access is weak for any other group. The black, Hispanic, and other-race net effects are significantly negative in virtually no areas. The net effect from all race and language variables combined (the last row in the table) is significantly negative in areas where only 13.5% of non-whites live.
The race, ethnicity, and language variables are highly correlated, and one may suspect that multicollinearity is driving these results. The first estimation in Table 3 , in which the language variables are omitted, lends evidence that this is not the case. The results show that removing the language variables does not result in significant race and ethnicity coefficients, except for Native Americans. Therefore, this estimation further corroborates that race and ethnicity generally play little role in the broadband entry decision.
Here I further explore unequal broadband access opportunities for Asians and Native Americans, the groups for which the pessimists' case is strongest. The specifications above constrain the coefficients on the racial variables to be constant, which may not be the case. To explore this possibility, I estimate a generalized additive model (GAM) in which % Asian and % Native American enter the broadband equation nonparametrically.
In particular, the model for the observed binary availability variable y (taking value 1 if broadband is available, zero if not) is (1) were linear, the model would be a standard probit. Instead, f and g are nonparametric smoothing functions (cubic B-splines). 23 The resulting partial fits are shown in Figure 5 . When the fitted curve slopes down in these graphs, the marginal effect of the variable on availability is negative. For comparison, if the variable were constrained to enter the model in linear form, the partial fit would be a line with slope equal to the estimated coefficient.
If Asians and Native Americans faced consistent discrimination (of any sort), the fitted curves would be negatively sloped everywhere. However, the effects of these vari-ables are clearly not monotonic. In only 50% of the areas does % Asian have a negative effect. When weighted by Asian population, this figure is 72%. For % Native American, the effect is negative in only 12% of areas (44% when weighted by Native American population), although that subset includes the areas with the highest concentrations (mainly reservations). 24 So even without taking into account the countervailing effects of language, 25 the evidence indicates that unequal availability for Asians and Native Americans is not uniform across areas. In fact, in 50% of the areas, having marginally more
Asians increases the probability of broadband access-this is probably why the linear coefficient for % Asian was positive in the simple estimations in Table 2 . Similarly, in 88% of the areas, having marginally more Native Americans increases the probability of broadband access.
Income
There is no statistically significant evidence for unequal access based on income.
The income coefficients have the expected signs-access is more likely the higher is median income and less likely the more households are in poverty-but neither is significant. 26 The reason why the income coefficient was significant in the simple estimation in Table 2 but not here is again likely to be due to omitted variables. Wealthier areas are likely to have lower costs of providing broadband, due to better infrastructure, higher phone density, and higher population density. It appears carriers' lower costs may induce them to roll out broadband earlier in wealthier locations, not necessarily income per se.
Rural Location
The geographic coefficients are all negative (compared to "urban but outside urbanized area"). That rural and inner city areas lag in access has been found in other studies (FCC 2000b 
Effects Of Other Market Characteristics
The market size coefficients for households and firms are positive and significant.
The marginal effect of 0.034 for log number of households means that if the number of households nearly tripled, there would be about a three and a half percentage point increase in the probability of broadband access. 27 The marginal effect of the size of the business market (number of firms) is about twice as strong.
Of the significant age coefficients, each age group's effect is positive compared to the excluded senior group. Similarly, the education coefficients are all positive, compared to the excluded group lacking a high school degree or equivalent. The commuting distance coefficients have the expected signs for the most part. A larger fraction of workers at home increases access likelihood. For commuters, the longer the commute, the higher the access probability (with the exception of the longest commuters, one hour plus).
The fraction of households with a telephone has a nonmonotonic effect on access.
Since DSL requires a phone line to function, it is not surprising that in the region where most of the observations lie, the interval (0.925-1.0), the marginal effect is positive. Of the business coefficients, only the fraction of small firms-a negative effect-is significant.
Exploratory analysis revealed that the cost variables have nonmonotonic relationships to broadband access. In the estimations in Table 3 , I used linear spline functions for the cost variables. The ordinates of the knots were chosen based on visual inspection of nonparametric partial fits; the knots are close to the first and third quartiles in each case.
Phone density has the expected positive sign in the region in which most of the data appear (>0.4). None of the population density coefficients is significant, probably because the set of urban and rural dummy variables are closely related. The age of housing structures, as a proxy for network infrastructure vintage, has the expected negative sign in the ranges up to 17.5 years and greater than 35 years, but not in the middle range.
All Bell Operating Company indicators are significant and positive, probably because the Bell companies are rolling out broadband faster than other local exchange carriers, even after controlling for differences in demand characteristics among regions.
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Local Telecommunications Competition
The third estimation in Table 3 
VI. IMPLICATIONS
This study contributes a better understanding of the determinants of the availability of broadband Internet access. Notwithstanding that the market is well on its way toward full diffusion on the supply side, there has been concern at the FCC and elsewhere about broadband availability for minority, low income, and rural households. Careful research into these issues is warranted given the federal mandate to deploy broadband to "all Americans" and the demonstrated willingness of the FCC to spend significant resources to encourage universal service.
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The results above give no statistically significant evidence of unequal availability based on income. There is some evidence for unequal availability for Asians and Native
Americans; the case to be made for discrimination (profit-based or otherwise) against any other racial or ethnic group is very weak. Even for Asians and Native Americans, the evidence for unequal availability is inconsistent across the range of the variables. Further study of broadband diffusion will be aided by the FCC's ongoing data collection. The FCC broadband survey is given every six months, which will allow panel data methods to be used in future explorations. Given that income and racial composition vary much more over the cross-section than over time, however, panel data may not add much to the investigation. The instrument in the CLEC equation is the proxy cost for local telecommunications service in the local exchange area, as calculated by the FCC's Hybrid Cost Proxy Model (HCPM) in January 2000. The HCPM is an economic engineering model that calculates the cost of providing local telecommunications service using efficient technology, given an area's geographic terrain and subscriber density. Proxy costs are not available from the model for about one-third of the wire centers (mostly for smaller carriers); in these cases I used the proxy cost of the nearest wire center for which cost was available. 2 "The problem is not that the disconnected do not participate in physical space, it is that they cannot participate in cyberspace" (Cooper, 2000) . "[Broadband is] not being deployed to all Americans because of the realities of the marketplace, which by its nature cannot serve all customers equally…. Rural, minority, low-income populations and people with disabilities are some of those groups who are not able to fully access the tech- 104-104, Title VII, Feb. 9, 1996, 110 Stat. 153. 6 I will use the terms "wire center" and "central office" interchangeably. They are the primary points at which local exchange carriers connect subscribers to the public switched telephone network. 99-12033 and 00-4001, 9 November 2000, at 46, and FCC [2000a] at 39).
Captions for Figures:
18 Given the rapid changes in the BOCs' coverage areas due to mergers, the variables reflect only the traditional BOC service areas (for example, Southern New England Telephone's area is not included with SBC, nor is GTE's with Verizon). 22 Similarly, none of the statistically significant coefficients change sign if a logit specification is used instead of probit. 23 The model (Hastie and Tibshirani, 1990 ) is estimated with the gam command in SPlus, where the s smoother is used for the z's. Notes: "evidence of a lower probability of broadband access" in an area means that the combined marginal effect of the variables in the first column on access probability is negative. Table 3 . In the second column, the summand is weighted by the relevant minority population (the first variable listed in the row headings) in the ZIP code. In the third column, an area is counted (and weighted, as in previous column) if it has a negative effect large enough to reject the null hypothesis that x i ′b > 0 at the 5% level. ginal effects of the variable on broadband availability. Ticks at bottom of plots mark the sample data. Abscissae are calibrated so the y value is zero at the mean x in the sample.
